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This study reexamines whether the occurrence of merger waves
can be explained by the neoclassical hypothesis or the behavioral
hypothesis. Using merger data for the period spanning 1990 through
2001, this study directly compares the two theories and finds that, in
general, merger waves occur at the time the capital liquidity is high,
firms’ stocks are overvalued, and deregulatory events exist. These
suggest that the existence of an economic motivation for transac-
tions and the availability of lower transaction cost and/or overval-
ued stock to generate large volume of transactions may cause
industry merger waves to cluster in time
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Introduction
Recent research on mergers has
focused on the cause of their occur-
rence in waves. Two theories have
been proposed, one consistent with
neoclassical economics and the other
based on assumptions derived from
behavioral finance theory. The neo-
classical theory proposes that the im-
petus for merger waves stems from
shocks to the economic, technologi-
cal, and/or regulatory environment of
an industry while the behavioral fi-
nance based theory proposes that
merger waves are a function of market
misvaluation of bidder and target firms
(Shleifer and Vishny 2003).
This study replicates that of
Harford (2005) who examined whether
merger waves during the 1980s and
1990s were driven by industry shocks
or stock market misvaluation. Based
on his results, Harford concludes that
industry shocks in conjunction with
time-varying changes in capital liquid-
ity are accounted for merger waves
better than behavioral factors. In con-
trast, the results reported in this study,
which uses merger data for the period
spanning 1990 through to 2001 indi-
cate that merger waves are driven by
stock market misvaluation, higher capi-
tal liquidity, and the presence of
deregulatory event. Nevertheless, the
results from univariate analysis indi-
cate that the abnormally high changes
in variables related to the neoclassical
hypothesis (e.g. sales growth) may also
drive merger waves. In general, firms
attempt to improve their performance
by undertaking mergers when capital
liquidity is high, their stock is overval-
ued, and deregulatory events exist. The
existence of an economic motivation
for transactions and the availability of
lower cost transaction and/or overval-
ued stock to generate large volume of
transactions may cause industry merger
waves to cluster in time.
Literature Review
Although it is well documented
that merger activity occurs in waves
that tend to be concentrated in indus-
tries and the industries have been dif-
ferent in each of the major waves iden-
tified to date, there is no consensus as
to why merger waves occur. Neoclas-
sical economists favor structural rather
than behavioral explanations and they
posit that a high proportion of mergers
are a reaction to shocks (i.e., economic
upheavals) that alter equilibrium in-
dustry structure. Other economists pro-
pose that merger waves are a function
of market inefficiency and that periods
of high merger activity are driven by
incidences of unusually high market
misvaluations. The two explanations
are not mutually exclusive but their
respective proponents differ on the
extent to which the explanations ac-
count for mergers.
Neoclassical Explanation of
Merger Waves and Empirical
Evidence
Principal papers advocating the
neo-classical perspective on merger
waves include Gort (1969), Morck et
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al. (1988), and Jensen (1993). Gort
(1969) is the first study to document
interindustry variation in the rate of
takeover activity and the first to ob-
serve that merger waves are consistent
with an economic disturbance model.
In line with Gort’s theory, Morck et al.
(1988) posit that a key determinant of
merger, takeover and LBO activity in
the 1980s was the need to restructure
industries that had experienced ad-
verse economic shocks. Similarly,
Jensen (1993) contends that most
merger activity since the mid-1970s
has been caused by technological and
supply shocks.
Later studies investigated the in-
dustry shock hypothesis in more de-
tail. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)
update Gort’s analysis by assessing
whether industry shocks contributed
to the extensive takeover activity of
target firms over the period 1982
through to 1989. Consistent with Gort’s
theory, they find that the variations in
takeover activity across industry and
in the time-series pattern of takeovers
by industry during the 1982 to 1989
sample period are significant. Simi-
larly, Andrade and Stafford (2004)
examined whether industry-wide
forces precipitated merger activity of
acquiring firms during the 1970-1994
period. Both studies test whether take-
over and restructuring activity is higher
in industries that experience shocks of
the greatest magnitude. Andrade and
Stafford (2004) find strong support for
the existence of both expansionary and
contractionary motivations for merger
activity. Their analysis reveals that the
relative importance of each of the
merger roles changes over time, de-
pending on economic conditions.
To investigate more closely the
relation between takeover activity and
industry shocks, Mitchell and Mulherin
(1996) and Andrade and Stafford
(2004) developed a proxy for industry
shocks based on sales data. Both stud-
ies find a direct relationship between
sales shocks and industry takeover
activity. In addition, Mitchell and
Mulherin (1996) documented a direct
relationship between employment
shocks and industry merger activity.
To identify the sources of industry
change that lead to takeover activity,
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) then
investigated the impact of likely shock-
inducing factors such as deregulation,
energy price volatility, foreign com-
petition, and financing innovations.
Their analysis shows that specific
shocks such as deregulation and fi-
nancing innovations contributed to the
high incidence of takeovers and re-
structuring activity during the 1980s.
These findings provide substantial
empirical evidence in support of
Jensen’s (1993) proposition that most
merger activity since the mid-1970s
has been caused by technological, regu-
latory, and broad economic changes
that have had disproportionately large
impact on certain industries. Andrade
and Stafford (2004) also support this
framework by finding that related-in-
dustry mergers follow industry shocks
and occur in times of excess capacity,
which is consistent with their hypoth-
esis of contractionary motive for merg-
ers.
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In similar vein to the study of
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and
Andrade and Stafford (2004), Mulherin
and Boone (2000) measured the im-
pact of economic shocks on corporate
restructuring activity by studying
whether there are industry patterns in
the rate of not only acquisitions but
also divestitures during the 1990 to
1999 period. Their consideration of
both acquisitions and divestitures and
emphasis on 1990s distinguishes their
work from previous studies. Their re-
sults show that almost half of the sample
firms were acquired and/or engaged in
a major divestiture, a finding similar to
that reported by Mitchell and Mulherin
(1996) who document that about half
of their sample firms experienced a
takeover attempt during the 1982 to
1989 period. These results show that
the U.S. corporate restructuring in the
1990s is comparable to the significant
merger movements that take place in
the 1980s. Moreover, Mulherin and
Boone (2000) confirm the industry-
level clustering of mergers for the
1990s by finding a significant varia-
tion in takeover activity as well as in
divestiture.
Mulherin and Boone (2000) also
attempted to identify the sources of
inter-industry variation in acquisition
activity and consider whether acquisi-
tion activity in the 1990s is driven by
similar factors as the 1980s. They iden-
tify deregulation and rapid change in
technology which lead to industry over-
capacity as the main factors that stimu-
lated acquisition activity in 1990s and
find that deregulation has a significant
and positive effect on the acquisition
activity in the 1990s, consistent with
the 1980s. They also compared the
rate of acquisition activity across in-
dustries in 1980s and 1990s and con-
firm that while there is significant re-
structuring activity in both the 1980s
and 1990s, there is not a one-to-one
relation in the affected industries. This
is consistent with the finding of
Andrade et al. (2001) that industries
that demonstrate high degrees of
merger activity in one decade are no
more likely to do so in other decades.
Andrade et al. (2001) confirm the in-
dustry-level clustering of mergers for
the 1990s by providing evidence that
merger activity in the 1990s, as in
previous decades, is strongly clustered
by industry and find deregulation as a
key driver of merger activity over that
decade.
Similar to the studies above,
Harford (2005) also investigated the
causes of merger waves. He applied a
random simulation procedure to iden-
tify merger waves in industries during
the 1980s and 1990s. He finds 35 waves
from 28 industries, with seven indus-
tries experiencing two distinct waves.
He identified reasons for the emer-
gence of waves by analyzing news
reports around the time of each wave
and undertook some tests that directly
compared the neoclassical model and
the behavioral model. His results sup-
port a neoclassical explanation of
merger waves that merger waves oc-
cur in response to specific industry
shocks that require large-scale reallo-
cation of assets. However, a puzzle
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that the standard neo-classical theory
unable to address is why waves should
be significantly more concentrated in
time than the ostensible economic
shocks that prompt them. Harford pos-
its that restructurings require capital
liquidity to implement and that shocks
only propagate a merger wave when
economic conditions generate suffi-
cient capital liquidity to accommodate
the necessary transactions (the reallo-
cation of assets). His results support
this interpretation.
In sum, Harford’s interpretation
of neoclassical theory provides a plau-
sible explanation of shocks as the driver
of industry merger waves. Neverthe-
less, the theory still does not account
for significant features of takeover
waves such as whether cash or stock is
used as medium of payment. Further-
more, the theory does not explain ag-
gregate merger waves unless it is as-
sumed that a group of industries expe-
rience shocks simultaneously. A be-
havioral explanation of merger waves
that accommodates factors ignored in
the neoclassical theory has been pro-
posed by Shleifer and Vishny (2003)
and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004). It is discussed in the following
section.
Behavioral Explanation of
Merger Waves and Empirical
Evidence
The positive correlation between
merger activity and stock valuation
has been noted by Melicher et al.
(1983), Becketti (1986), and Golbe
and White (1988). Recent theoretical
work by Shleifer and Vishny (2003)
and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004) have addressed this correla-
tion. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) pro-
posed that market misvaluation drives
merger transactions. The theory as-
sumes that significant information
asymmetry exists among stock market
participants and the presence of self-
interested, informed target managers
who exploit their superior knowledge
to profit themselves at the expense of
shareholders. The theory works as fol-
lows, information asymmetry occurs.
Managers know the true value of their
own firms and that of potential target
or acquirer firms. They also know the
extent of the divergence of the short-
run valuation of their firm from the
long-term and the synergies available
to be exploited. They use this informa-
tion to maximize their personal wealth.
Given these conditions, Shleifer and
Vishny (2003) posit that target manag-
ers sell their firms for stock in a long-
run manager’s firm when both firms
are overvalued even though the trans-
action price gives the short-run man-
ager less than he knows his firm will be
worth in the long run. The target man-
ager profits by selling his acquired
shares into the overvalued market.
Since the market is inefficient, it does
not react to this deception over the
target managers’ relevant horizon.
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) point
out that their theory explains several
otherwise puzzling elements in take-
over waves, including the fact that
they are highly concentrated in time,
cluster during high stock market valu-
ations period, and generally use stock
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as medium of payment, as pointed out
by Nelson (1959) and confirmed by
Andrade et. al. (2001). The evidence
that merger activity, especially merg-
ers for stock, is correlated with the
level and dispersion of stock market
valuations as documented by Verter
(2002) which is also consistent with
their model.
Another theoretical model in
which the target underestimates (over-
estimates) market-wide overvaluation
when the market is overvalued (under-
valued) is proposed by Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan (2004). Their ap-
proach is based on a rational model of
mergers financed with stock and is
built on the idea that only limited in-
formation is available for targets in
their attempt to value offers. In this
model, private information is on bid-
der and target rationally leads to a
correlation between stock merger ac-
tivity and market valuation. Although
the target’s and bidder’s private infor-
mation tells them whether they are
overvalued or undervalued, they can-
not separately identify the sources of
the misvaluation. As the target firm
has limited information about the com-
ponents of the misvaluation, it has
difficulty in assessing the synergies
which are critical in the model. Errors
in valuing potential takeovers syner-
gies are correlated with overall valua-
tion error. A large number of valuation
errors may cause merger waves be-
cause ex post, targets have mistakenly
over-estimated synergies. In short, this
model incorporates both firm-specific
and market-wide misvaluation as con-
tributing factors to merger waves.
Although the theories of Shleifer
and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan (2004) do not model
the source of market misvaluation and
economically to be very different, they
yield parallel empirical predictions on
the link between misvaluation and
mergers. In the theory of Shleifer and
Vishny (2003), highly overvalued
firms, whose shareholders are assumed
to be long-term investors, appear as a
result of market misvaluation. Less
overvalued targets with short-term
shareholders are acquired by these
overvalued firms. The theory predicts
that, in cash acquisitions, bidders at-
tempt to profit by buying targets that
are undervalued in absolute terms (i.e.,
relative to fundamentals) or by buying
target that are undervalued (less over-
valued) relative to the bidders in stock
acquisitions. Target managers accept
payment with stock if the target is also
overvalued. This transaction gives tar-
get management the chance to ‘cash
out’ of their illiquid stock or options.
More generally, the misvaluation hy-
pothesis reflects the insight that the
willingness of target management to
cash out should tend to be greater
when the target is less undervalued (or
more overvalued). In addition, stock
acquisitions are more likely to occur
when a large dispersion of valuations
exists in the market, signs of overvalu-
ation relative to fundamental are shown
by the bidders, and bidders either have
relatively longer horizons than those
of the targets, or alternatively pay off
target managers to consent to the stock
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merger. Generally, these predictions
are consistent with the theory of
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004).
Three studies that empirically ex-
amine market misvaluation theory are
Ang and Cheng (2003), Dong et al.
(2002), and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2004).
Ang and Cheng (2003), using a merger
sample covering the years 1984 to
2001, examined how misvaluation af-
fects merger transactions. They used
the price-to-book (P/B) ratio and re-
sidual income model (RIM) as mea-
sures for overvaluation. They also ex-
amined whether and how overvalued
bidders create or destroy wealth for
their shareholders using the long-term
abnormal return of the combined firms.
Dong et al. (2002), also examined the
effects of market misvaluation on
merger activity and estimated
misvaluation using the ratio of book
value of equity to price and the ratio of
residual income value to price for the
period of 1978 to 2000. Their investi-
gation covered a wide set of takeover
characteristics such as merger vs. ten-
der offers and hostile vs. friendly take-
overs. Using a sample of mergers for
the period of 1978 to 2001, Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2004) examined how firm
and industry valuation relate to level
of merger activity and medium of pay-
ment. They also used market-to-book
ratio to explore misvaluation empiri-
cally.
Ang and Cheng (2003) document
that the trend of targets’ overvaluation
over the years is different to that of
acquirers’ overvaluation. This suggests
that the acquirers not only acquire tar-
gets that rise with the market, but also
look for bargains. They argue that the
underlying premise in Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan (2004) on the inabil-
ity of the target firms to differentiate
the effects of market overvaluation on
firm value from synergy is supported
by their evidence. They also find that
acquirers, on average, are overvalued
based on both absolute (P/B) and rela-
tive measures (RIM) which supports
their hypothesis that acquirers are more
overvalued than the targets. A similar
result is also documented by Dong et
al. (2002) who find that overvaluation
is present in both cash and stock offers
but is stronger among stock offers.
Moreover, Ang and Cheng (2003) find
that acquirers are more overvalued than
non-acquirers and after they control
for other factors, such as industry ef-
fect, that may potentially affect the
firm’s decision to acquire, the prob-
ability of a firm becoming an acquirer
significantly increases with its degree
of overvaluation.
Since overvalued acquirers can
only profit from their misvaluation by
paying for their target firm with their
stock, Ang and Cheng (2003) and Dong
et al. (2002) postulate and verify that
stock-paying acquirers are substan-
tially more overvalued then cash-pay-
ing acquirers. Ang and Cheng’s (2003)
logistic regression analysis shows that
the probability of stocks being utilized
as the payment method significantly
increases with the acquirer’s overvalu-
ation. Both studies also document that
targets who receive cash bids are sig-
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nificantly more undervalued than tar-
gets offered stock as consideration. In
addition, Ang and Cheng (2003) find
less overvaluation of targets than their
acquirers in both cash and stock merg-
ers. Dong et al. (2002) also document
the association between target over-
valuation and the use of stock as well
as the relationship between target un-
dervaluation and the use of cash as a
means of payment. They also find that
acquirers with higher estimated over-
valuation are more likely to offer stock
instead of cash as the sole form of
consideration and that acquirers are
more willing to pay higher premiums.
The former finding is consistent with
bidders attempting to profit by ex-
changing stock that is overvalued for
target assets. Rhodes-Kropf et al.
(2004) also document findings similar
to the Ang and Cheng (2003) and Dong
et al. (2002) studies by confirming the
occurrence of merger waves when mar-
ket valuations are high relative to “true”
valuations. However, they note that
their results are not only consistent
with the behavioral mispricing theory
but also with the interpretation that
merger activity spikes when growth
opportunities are high or when firm-
specific discount rates are low. This
latter interpretation is similar to a neo-
classical hypothesis with a capital li-
quidity component.
Table 1. Predictions and Findings of the Neoclassical and Behavioral Hy-
potheses for Merger Waves
Neoclassical Behavioral Finding
Reason for industry Regulatory or economic Overvaluation and Regulatory, economic
 wave shock accompanied by dispersion of valuation shocks, capital liquidity,
capital liquidity  within industry  stock, overvaluation
Reason for aggregate Multiple simultaneous Overvaluation and As aggregate clustering
wave industry waves clustering dispersion in the of merger activity is
because of macro aggregate strongly explained by
liquidity factor the industry-level merger
wave, it is suggestive that
the cause of aggregate
wave similar to the cause
of industry wave
Pre-wave market-to-book High if capital liquidity High High
ratios is tied to asset valuation
Measures of tight credit Low if capital liquidity No  Prediction Low
is important
Post-merger operating Better than without a Worse in waves Mixed
 performance merger
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Predictions
The predictions of the neoclassi-
cal and behavioral hypotheses of
merger waves in this study are similar
to those of Harford (2005) and sum-
marized in Table 1. The empirical find-
ings of this study which are discussed
in Section 5 are also previewed in the
Table 1.
Data and Tests for the Presence
of a Merger Wave
This study uses data on merger
activity from the Securities Data
Company’s (SDC) Platinum. The da-
tabase provides a comprehensive
source of information on various as-
pects of merger activity such as mode
of payment, attitude of the deal, and
source of funds. In addition, it covers
merger activity across the world’s
major financial markets. The data gath-
ered in this study includes information
about successful US merger transac-
tions that took place during the period
of January 1990 to December 2001
with a value of transaction at least
US$50 million. The merger transac-
tions selected are those involving listed
acquirer and target firms. Companies
are grouped into 48 industries as per
Fama and French (1997), based on SIC
codes.
Harford’s (2003) simulation pro-
cedure is followed to identify merger
waves. It is implemented as follows.
Each bidder and target is sorted into
one of 48 industry groups, based on
their respective SIC codes at the time
of the bid announcement. Bidders and
targets from industries are assigned to
their own industry. For each industry,
the highest concentration of completed
merger bids involving firms in that
industry within a 24-month period
(overlap) is identified and tagged as a
potential wave. To confirm a potential
wave as an actual wave the following
simulation procedure is followed to
construct a distribution of merger con-
centrations that facilitates testing of
the economic significance of each
merger wave concentration. The total
number of merger bids for a given
industry over the 144-month sample
period (i.e., 12 years x 12 months) is
identified. Each bid is then randomly
assigned to one of the 144-months
with the probability of assignment be-
ing 1/144 for each month. This is re-
peated 1000 times. Then, the highest
concentration of merger activity within
a 24-month period from each of the
1000 draws is calculated. The actual
concentration of activity from the po-
tential wave is compared to the empiri-
cal distribution based on the simulated
data. If the actual peak concentration
exceeds the 95th percentile from that
empirical distribution, that period is
coded as a wave. For instance, the
cluster of completed merger bids in the
Communications industry is coded as
a wave because the 34 percent mergers
(57 out of 168) that occurred within
one 24-month period, starting in July
of 1997, is greater than the 95th percen-
tile of maximum concentration within
any 24-month period based on the em-
pirical distribution which is only 28
percent. The final result of the mergers
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Table 2. Industries’ Merger Wave
Industry Start and The Cause of the Wave
Aircraft Jan, 1999. Big, older fleets require increased maintenance, repair
and overhaulIncreasingly outsourced from carriers, who want
‘‘one-stop shops’’
Banking Oct, 1996. Deregulation and Information Technology (IT)
Business Services Sep, 1998. Fragmented, smaller players combine, share cost
structures, offer more complete line of services to customers—
industry grows as outsourcing takes off
Business Supplies Feb, 1997. Paper and pulp industry consolidates from fragmented
price takers to gain market power and avoid costly duplication of
capital intensive production facilities
Chemicals Mar, 1995. Large cash flows, over capacity in production, need
to consolidate research
Communication July, 1997. Deregulation: Telecommunications Act in 1996,
consolidation, technological changes
Computers Jun, 1998. Internet
Electronic Equipment Feb, 1999. OEM’s growth leads to demand for electronic equip-
ment manufacturers to shift from small regional players to larger
global players capable of infrastructure, IT, etc. to grow with
their customers
Entertainment Mar, 1998. Studios seek diversified production sources and
strong libraries; Telecom act of 1996 relaxes media ownership
limits
Food Products Jan, 1999. Retail consolidation pushes distribution consolidation
and/or sale of distributors to bigger retailers who want to buy
rather than build distribution channels
Healthcare May, 1996. Service providers consolidate to have bargaining
power with HMOs
Insurance Nov, 1998. Bigger is safer, leading to consolidation, especially in
re-insurers
Machinery May, 1996. Large manufacturers decreased number of suppliers
they were willing to deal with in bid to improve efficiency. This
forced consolidation in a number of capital goods industries—
many smaller players were bought in “roll-up” deals
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Continued from Table 2
Industry Start and The Cause of the Wave
Measuring and Oct, 1998. Depression in semiconductor industry (big customer)
Control Equipment
Medical Equipment Nov, 1998. Two motives: first, acquisitions in core areas to grow,
then acquisitions outside core areas to offer broad products to
increasingly consolidated customer base (hospitals)
Personal Services Feb, 1996. Consolidation in legal and funeral services industries
Petroleum and June, 1997. Increasing prices, record drilling, increasing costs
Natural lead drive to increase size to be more efficient
Pharmaceutical Oct, 1998. Mid-sized companies merge to garner size necessary
to fund
Products  increasingly large costs of development
Restaurant, Hotels, Dec, 1996. Operators such as Starwood have buying sprees.
Others buy
Motels properties to gain sufficient bulk to compete in corporate account
business market
Retail Aug, 1996. Strong growth and impact of internet
Shipbuilding, Aug, 1998. Shrinking defence budgets finally forced the issue of
Railroad Equipment overcapacity in the industry
Steel Works Sep, 1997.  Collapse in demand from Asia leads to falling prices
forcing consolidation
Transportation July, 1997. End of Interstate Commerce Commission, overca-
pacity in shipping, open skies agreements, railroad consolidation
started with a few big mergers and then forced responses to
balance
Utilities Nov, 1997. Deregulation in some markets plus elimination of a
law prohibiting mergers between noncontiguous providers
Wholesale June, 1996. Simultaneous consolidation in several wholesale
sectors as growth slows and firms move to add breadth, take
advantage of new IT ability, grow by acquisition
The procedure described in Section 4 results in industries with merger wave and starting
dates of the merger wave. The reasons for the wave to occur are taken from Harford (2005).
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simulation is 25 waves, as can be seen
in Table 2. Another industry, Candy
and Soda, claimed by Harford to have
a merger wave in the 1990s does not
appear in the simulation result. The
average number of bids during the 24-
month wave period over the 12-years
sampling period is 40 whereas the av-
erage number of bids during the 24-
month non-wave period is 15.29.
Results
This study examines a set of fac-
tors predicted by the neoclassical
theory to be related to merger waves.
These factors include net income to
sales, asset turnover (sales divided by
beginning-of-period assets), research
and development (scaled by begin-
ning-of-period assets), capital expen-
ditures (scaled by beginning-of-period
of assets), employee growth, return on
assets, and sales growth. These factors
are argued to capture economic shocks
to operating environment of an indus-
try and the selection of these factors is
motivated by studies of Healy et al.
(1992), Clark and Ofek (1994), and
Switzer (1996) who investigated the
changes in the performance of acquir-
ing and target firms around mergers
and Mitchel and Mulherin (1996) who
assessed whether industry shocks,
proxied by sales and number of em-
ployee, contributed to the extensive
merger activity in 1980s. The market-
to-book ratio is also another potential
economic characteristic to capture in-
dustry shocks. However, interpreta-
tion of this variable is ambiguous as it
is also claimed by the behavioral hy-
pothesis.
Univariate Evidence
In this section, the set of industry
characteristics prior to merger wave
are examined. The variables are exam-
ined in the year before the start of an
industry’s merger wave. As each of the
25 industries over the 12-year sam-
pling period has one wave, there are 25
industry-years preceding the start of a
merger wave. The median absolute
change in each of the variables in the
set is used to measure economic shocks
because the consequences of shocks
could be different across firms and the
average directional implication could
also be different due to the different
shocks across industries. The results
of the test are presented in Table 3 and
the number presented in the table is the
mean, across all industries, of this in-
dustry-specific median in the year im-
mediately prior to the start of the merger
wave. The 12-year time-series of shock
observations for each industry are also
ranked into quartiles and the cross-
industry mean rank of the shock in the
pre-wave year is presented. As shown
in the table, the variables in which the
changes are abnormally high prior to
each wave include capital expendi-
tures, employee growth, and sales
growth (at 0.05 level). The time-series
ranks for these three variables show
that the pre-wave changes are high for
the average industry. In addition, mar-
ket-to-book, the variable that is related
to both the neoclassical and behavioral
hypotheses, is the only variable in
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which the change is abnormally high
in the year preceding a wave. The time
series-rank in the table indicates that
the pre-wave change for this variable
is also high for the average industry.
The findings in this univariate test
only support some of the findings in
Harford (2005). In his study, Harford
finds that all changes in the variables
that are related to the neoclassical hy-
pothesis and to both the neoclassical
and behavioral hypotheses are abnor-
mally high before the wave (at 0.1
level).
Table 3. Economic Shocks Measures and Market-to-Book
Economic Shocks Market-to-Book variables
(Variables related to Mean Rank (Variables related to both Mean Rank
the neoclassical neoclassical and behavioral
hypothesis) hypotheses)
Net Income to Sales 0.065 2.44 Market-to-Book 0.730 3.04
H0: Rank = 2.5 [0.822] H0: Rank = 2.5 [0.012]
Asset Turnover 0.169 2.80 Change in Market-to-Book 0.457 2.20
H0: Rank = 2.5 [0.170] H0: Rank = 2.5 [0.201]
Research & Development 0.016 2.44 Industry σ (Market-to-Book) 18.352 2.24
H0: Rank = 2.5 [0.802] H0: Rank = 2.5 [0.295]
Capital Expenditure 0.026 3.04
H0: Rank = 2.5 [0.003]
Employee Growth 0.174 3.28
H0: Rank = 2.5 [0.001]
Return on Assets 0.054 2.72
H0: Rank = 2.5 [0.381]
Sales Growth 0.183 2.84
H0: Rank = 2.5 [0.046]
The variables are used to measure economic shocks to the industry: net income to sales (profitabil-
ity), asset turnover, research and development, capital expenditures, employee growth, return on
assets, and sales growth. For each industry-year, the median absolute change in each of above
variables is computed. Market-to-book and dispersion in market-to-book are either economic
variables or misvaluation proxies. For all variables, the number presented in the table is the mean,
across all industries, of this industry-specific median in the year immediately preceding the start of
the merger wave (there are 25 industry-year observations for this pre-wave year). For each industry,
the 12-year time series of shock observations is ranked into quartiles and the table presents the cross-
industry mean rank of the shock in the pre-wave year. As in Harford, a test is performed on the
average difference between a rank of 2.5 (middle) and the ranking of the pre-wave year within its
own industry time series. The p-value for the hypothesis that this difference is zero is presented in
brackets.
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To test whether a macro compo-
nent (proxy for capital liquidity) may
explain merger waves, Harford (2005)
applied the capital liquidity arguments
advanced by Shleifer and Vishny
(1992) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2003)
to the analysis of merger waves. The
proxy for liquidity that he used is the
spread between the Federal Funds rate
and the average interest rate on com-
mercial and industrial loans. As stock
mergers do not require access to the
credit markets, Harford does not assert
that the accessibility of commercial
and industrial credit have a direct causal
effect on merger activity. Instead, based
on the results of the Lown et al. (2000)
who find the degree to which the Se-
nior Loan Officer survey reports tight-
ening is strongly correlated with the
spread between the average interest
rate on commercial and industrial loans
and the Federal Funds rate, Harford
argues that the rate spread may be used
as a proxy for overall liquidity or ease
of financing in the economy and the
rate spread will be correlated with
transaction costs in the neoclassical
model with transaction costs. Because
higher asset values accommodate capi-
tal liquidity in an industry, Harford
also includes an industry-specific in-
teraction variable that accounts for the
valuation levels in the industry in the
empirical specifications to test the
model.
Following Harford, the four-quar-
ter moving average of the rate spread is
plotted against aggregate merger ac-
tivity and is presented in Figure 1.
Consistent with Harford’s findings, an
inverse relation between the rate spread
and aggregate merger activity is evi-
dent in Figure 1. An increase in merger
activity is preceded by a decrease in
the rate spread and the end of a merger
wave is indicated by an increase in the
rate spread (r= -0.461, p= 0.012).
It may be expected that the rate
spread, the proxy for transaction costs,
is correlated with some of the key
variables in the behavioral models. As
shown in Figure 2, the rate spread is
correlated with both overall median
market-to-book and the three-year com-
pounded return on the S&P 500 index.
The correlation between lagged
changes in the rate spread and current
changes in the market-to-book ratio is
strongly significant (r= -0.548, p=
0.028) and the reverse, the correlation
between lagged changes in the market-
to-book and current change in the rate
spread is also strongly significant (r=
-0.655, p= 0.006). Therefore, incon-
sistent with Harford, it is hard to say
whether the decrease in the rate spread
leads to increases in the market-to-
book ratio or vice versa. However, the
correlation between lagged changes in
the rate spread and current changes in
the S&P500 is strongly significant
(r= -0.666, p= 0.005) and the reverse is
not true, the correlation between
lagged changes in the S&P500 and the
current changes in the rate spread is
an in-significant -0.057. Based on
these last two correlations, it can be
said that that the rate spread precedes
the S&P500 returns and this is consis-
tent with the evidence presented in
Lown et al. (2000) on the effects of
15
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The line in the figure represent the spread between the fed funds rate and the average rate charged for commercial and
industrial loans as reported in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (right axis). This spread
is measured in percentage points and proxies for low capital liquidity. The vertical bars indicate the total number of
merger bids with a transaction value of at least $50 million in 2002 dollars (left axis).
Figure 1. Capital Liquidity and Aggregate Merger Activity
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changes in the ease of credit on overall
economic growth.
The results so far are mixed and
indicate that economic factors and
market-to-book, if counted as behav-
ioral hypothesis variables, drive merger
waves. It can be said that observable
economic shocks lead to industry
merger waves and those merger waves
cluster when capital liquidity is rela-
tively high (transaction costs are low)
and firms’ stocks are overvalued. To
distinguish these two interpretations,
successive logit models will be em-
ployed to predict merger waves. The
interpretation of the relation between
the behavioral variable and the rate
spread is also borne out by the model.
Because the behavioral variable is in-
cluded in the regression, the rate spread
will be insignificant if it is actually a
proxy for that variable. Alternatively,
if the behavioral variable is simply
capturing effects correlated with the
rate spread, then it will be insignifi-
cant.
Logit Models
The sample of 48 industries for
the 12-year sample period is included
in the logit model to estimate the start
of merger waves. The explanatory vari-
ables for the model are taken from
those analyzed in Table 3. The indus-
try-specific economic shock variables
within an industry, however, are highly
correlated and may cause multicol-
linearity if concurrently incorporated
in a regression model. To avoid this
potential problem, the first principal
component from the seven economic
shock variables (profitability, asset
turnover, research and development,
capital expenditures, employee growth,
return on assets, and sales growth) is
extracted. It is predicted by the capital
liquidity part of the neoclassical hy-
pothesis that these shocks will be less
likely to cause a wave when liquidity is
low. High liquidity years are defined
as the years in which the rate spread is
below its time-series median and the
industry’s market-to-book ratio is si-
multaneously above its time-series
median. Low liquidity years are all
other years. In the logit model, the
economic shock principal component
is entered on its own and interacted
with a dummy identifying low liquid-
ity years.
Table 4 presents the results of
estimating logit models of the start of
merger wave. As shown in the first
column of the table, consistent with
Harford’s finding, the industry mar-
ket-to-book by itself has some ability
to predict merger waves; an increase in
the market-to-book ratio will increase
the probability of a merger wave. In
the second column, the model is esti-
mated using the economic variables
only. The shock variable is signifi-
cantly positive which is consistent with
Harford’s finding. Furthermore, the
shock variable interacted with the
dummy variable for low liquidity is
insignificant which is inconsistent with
the study of Harford that finds the
shock variable is negative and signifi-
cant. The rate spread variable is nega-
tive and strongly significant and the
17
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Table 5. The Gap between the Year of Deregulation and the Year of Wave
Started for Deregulated Industries
Industry Deregulated Year of Deregulation Year of Wave Started
Entertainment 1992 1998
Petrol and Natural Gas 1992 1997
Utilities 1992 1997
Communications 1993 1997
Transportation 1993 1997
Transportation 1994 1996
Banking 1994 1997
Transportation 1995 1997
Communications 1996 1997
Utilities 1996 1997
Table 4. Predicting Merger Waves
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -3.194 -2.147 [0.000]
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M/Bt-1 0.333 0.616
[0.000] [0.000]
C&I Rate Spreadt-1 -6.571 -6.586
[0.000] [0.000]
Deregulatory Eventt-1 1.544 1.745
[0.000] [0.000]
Econ Shock Index 0.3862 0.209
[0.008] [0.139]
Econ Shock Index (Tight Capital) -1.556 -1.416
[0.766] [0.773]
Logit models are employed to predict when an industry will have a merger wave. The sample is 48 industries, each
over 12 years (1990–2001). The explanatory variables are measured at the end of year t-1. Market-to-book is the
industry median market-to-book ratio and the commercial and industrial (C&I) loan rate spread (spread above the fed
funds rate) proxies for low capital liquidity. There is also a dummy variable selecting years that were preceded by a
major deregulatory event. The economic shock index is the first principal component of the seven economic shock
variables in the first column of Table 3. The shock index is also interacted with a dummy variable selecting years when
market-to-book ratios are below their industry-specific time-series median or the C&I rate spread is above its time-
series median (years of low capital liquidity). The dependent variable is equal to one if the industry-year is the
beginning of a merger wave in that industry.
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deregulation indicator variable is posi-
tive and also strongly significant. The
finding on the deregulatory variable is
consistent with Harford’s (2005) find-
ing that deregulation precedes merger
waves in the 1980s and 1990s. This
finding is also consistent with Mulherin
and Boone (2000) who find a signifi-
cant and positive effect of deregula-
tion on acquisition activity in the 1990s
and Andrade et al. (2001) who find
deregulation is a key driver of merger
activity over that period. The years at
which the major deregulatory events
are announced and the starts of the
wave are presented in Table 5. The
univariate results confirm that capital
liquidity, industry shocks, and deregu-
lation propagate merger waves.
The full model, which is estimated
in the third column, indicates that the
shock variable becomes insignificant
and all other variables remain signifi-
cant. These full models support the
argument that merger wave is propa-
gated by the higher capital liquidity,
the presence of deregulatory event,
and the increase in firms’ market-to-
book ratio. These findings support the
behavioral hypothesis and only part of
neoclassical hypothesis.
As in Harford, this study also at-
tempts to answer whether clustering of
merger activity at the aggregate level
is caused by clustering of industry-
level merger waves. The relation be-
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tween aggregate merger activity and
the proportion of bids taking place in
the industry-level merger waves is iden-
tified and presented in Figure 3. The
figure clearly indicates that aggregate
merger waves take place when indus-
try-level merger waves cluster in time
and that the total merger activity in
these waves is driven by bids in the
industries experiencing waves. To for-
mally test this observation, the corre-
lation between the total number of
merger transactions in the economy
and the proportion of bids in industries
undergoing industry-specific waves is
computed. The correlation between
the two factors is highly significant
0.815.
This study also attempt to further
test the relation between the neoclassi-
cal explanation of industry level merger
waves and overall aggregate merger
activity by predicting aggregate merger
waves using a specification analogous
to that used to predict industry merger
waves. In addition, all procedures and
tests similar to those used to predict
industry merger waves are undertaken.
There are only 12 observations (one
for each year from 1990 to 2001) in-
cluded in the tests. The results of the
tests, however, all are insignificant
due to the small number of observa-
tions.
Operating Performance
Mergers motivated by an eco-
nomic rationale, as in industry shock
mergers, are expected to improve per-
formance. Nevertheless, evidence on
this merger is at best mixed (Agrawal
and Jaffe 2003) with many studies
documenting that bidders return are,
on average, negative (Andrade et al.
2001). On the other hand, mergers not
motivated by economic factors, as in
stock market misvaluation mergers,
may result in bidders experiencing
abnormally negative long-run returns
due to the fact that the firms are over-
valued in the first instance, and merged
firms enduring especially poor post-
merger operating performance.
This section discusses the operat-
ing performance test for mergers un-
dertaken in waves. Accounting data,
extracted from Compustat database,
of the acquirer and target firms prior to
the merger are used to calculate the pro
forma pre-merger performance of the
combined firms. To control for chang-
ing industry and economy-wide con-
ditions and for possible mean rever-
sion resulting from abnormal pre-event
performance, the industry-adjusted
performance of the acquirer and target
firms is used as a primary benchmark
to evaluate the post-merger perfor-
mance. Based on the Healy et al.’s
study (1992), the pre-merger industry-
adjusted operating performance and a
dummy variable (one for mergers that
occur in wave and zero otherwise) are
regressed against the post-merger in-
dustry-adjusted operating perfor-
mance. As in Healy et al’s study, the
average post-merger change in the per-
formance measure is captured by the
intercept in the regression. The dummy
variable indicates whether wave peri-
ods are different from non-wave peri-
ods. Because of mean-reversion in in-
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dustry-adjusted operating perfor-
mance, the slope coefficient is ex-
pected to be less than one as discussed
in Barber and Lyon (1996).
The results, presented in Table 6,
indicate that changes in profitability
and sales growth subsequent to merg-
ers in waves are worse than during
other periods and change in market-to-
book is no worse than during other
periods. As can be seen on the wave
dummy, the coefficient for market-to-
book is positive and significant (at
0.01 level) which means the post-
merger changes in market-to-book re-
mains significantly greater inside
waves. On the other hand, the coeffi-
cient for profitability and sales growth
are negative and significant (at 0.1
level). These results suggest that the
post-merger sales growth and profit-
ability decrease during the wave. Due
to the clustering of merger activity at
the industry level, the observations in
the regression are not independent.
Hence, tests of grouped-mean regres-
sion are also undertaken. The results
of these tests, however, do not change
the overall inferences.
In this study, the wave in which
the benchmark performance is likely
to be particularly poor is identified to
control for the unobservable bench-
mark problem in operating perfor-
mance tests. The identification is done
by creating a subsample of wave that
reacts to contractionary shocks. These
shocks occur when the pre-wave
change in sales growth and return on
assets are both negative and below
their medians. Then, the operating
performance regressions including a
dummy for contractionary waves are
reestimated. The results of the regres-
sions show none of the variables are
affected by the benchmarking prob-
lem and none of the inferences are
changed by the inclusion of the con-
traction dummy.
In general, the results of the oper-
ating performance regression are some-
what mixed. On one hand, as indicated
by market-to-book variable, merger
inside wave produce better post-merger
operating performance which is con-
sistent with neoclassical explanation.
On the other hand, as shown by sales
growth and profitability variables, there
is evidence in which mergers in waves
perform significantly worse than those
outside waves which is consistent with
the behavioral explanation.
Conclusion
This study reexamines whether
merger waves that occurred in the pe-
riod of 1990 to 2001 can be explained
by the neoclassical hypothesis or the
behavioral hypothesis. This study di-
rectly compares the two explanations
of merger wave and finds that merger
waves may be driven by higher capital
liquidity and stock market misvalua-
tion. In addition, the result for de-
regulatory variable indicates that
merger waves take place when deregu-
lation does exist. Overall, merger
waves occur at the time the capital
liquidity is high, firms’ stocks are over-
valued, and deregulatory events are
present. As indicated by the variables
22
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that related to the neoclassical hypoth-
esis (e.g. ROA), the industry shocks do
not propagate merger waves.
It is expected that mergers that
preceded by industry shock (economic
rational) is capable of improving per-
formance and those that led by market
misvaluation (no operational motive)
would produce particularly poor post-
merger operating performance. The
result of firms’ post-merger operating
performance tests support that both
the neoclassical hypothesis and the
behavioral hypothesis explain the oc-
currence of merger waves. As indi-
cated by market-to-book variable,
mergers inside waves produce better
post-merger operating performance
which is consistent with neoclassical
explanation and as shown by sales
growth and profitability variables, there
is evidence in which mergers in waves
perform significantly worse than those
outside waves which is consistent with
behavioral explanation.
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